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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES HORNSBY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent 
v. 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner 
CHARLES GIBLETT, JOHN SUTTON, 
and JOHN DOES I through X, 
inclusive, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI 
(Brief in Opposition to 
Petition for Certiorari 
to Review Judgment of Court 
of Appeals) 
Supreme Court No. 880318 
QUESTION FOR REVIEW 
IN A LAWSUIT IN WHICH ONE PARTY IS A RELIGIOUS 
ENTITY, IS IT REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL 
COURT JUDGE TO REFUSE TO VOIR DIRE PROSPECTIVE 
JURORS AS TO CERTAIN MATTERS INVOLVING THEIR 
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION, SO THAT A LITIGANT MAY 
INTELLIGENTLY EXERCISE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES? 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals concerning this 
case is reported at 87 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Ct. App. 1988) 
BASIS FOR JURISDICTION 
A. The decision to be reviewed was entered on July 26, 
1988. 
B. On September 23, 1988, Respondent herein filed a 
stipulation and motion for an extension of time in which to file 
his brief. An order granting Respondent's motion was entered on 
September 23, 1988, thereby granting Respondent until October 8, 
1988 in which to respond to Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari. 
C. Rule 44(c), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, is 
inapplicable, 
D. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the 
decision in question by a writ of certiorari pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-2-2(3): 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, overs 
(a) a judgment of the Court of 
Appeals; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature and Proceedings, This lawsuit was initiated to 
recover damages for personal injury sustained by plaintiff, James 
Hornsby when he laid down his motorcycle so as to avoid colliding 
with a cow that had escaped while defendants were attempting to 
load livestock on a truck* Judgment for defendants was entered 
upon a jury verdict. Plaintiff appealed, alleging inter alia, 
that the questioning of potential jurors during voir dire had been 
improperly limited. The Court of Appeals (Bench, Billings, 
Jackson, JJ.)# reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that the 
trial court's refusal to question the jurors concerning their 
membership in a defendant religious entity improperly curtailed 
the plaintiff's ability to intelligently exercise his peremptory 
challenges. Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 87 
Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1988) See appendix A. 
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2. Statement of Facts. Petitioner Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints is a religious corporation sole which holds title to a 
number of LDS properties, including a farm in Salt Lake County 
which is part of its welfare program. One Charles Giblett managed 
the farm. (R. 650, 631; Hornsby, at 23; App. A.) 
On March 30, 1983, Giblett and defendant John Sutton, owner 
of farmland adjacent to the LDS farmland, attempted to move two 
cows that had escaped from the LDS property to one of Sutton's 
pastures. In attempting to relocate the cattle, one of the cows 
escaped. (R. 629, 630, 650, 673, 662, 691, 598, 658, 660, 662, 
663; Hornsby at 23; app.A.) 
Giblett and Sutton pursued the runaway cow with the help of 
two boys and Sutton's daughter Mary. Mary drove her car up and 
down the area and then pulled to the roadside to search on foot. 
After spotting the runaway cow, she returned to her car. She saw 
Plaintiff Hornsby approaching on his motorcycle and waved her arms 
to get his attention. (R. 643, 938, 775, 561, 584, 777, 792, 
780, 782, 799, 797, 793; Hornsby at 23; app. A.) 
After Hornsby had passed Mary, he saw the cow come onto the 
road and he dropped his motorcycle, sustaining injuries in the 
process. Hornsby filed a cause of action, alleging a variety of 
claims of negligence. (R. 647, 923, 798, 579; Hornsby at 23; 
app. A.) 
During the voir dire process of the trial, the court asked 
prospective jurors the following question: 
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Are there any of you who feel that you would 
have trouble being an impartial juror because 
of feelings you may have either pro or con 
with regard to the LDS Church that you think 
might affect your ability to be a fair and 
impartial juror in this case? If so, I'd like 
you to raise your hand. 
(R. 1023-1025; Hornsbv at 23; app. A.) 
The court then stated for the record that all members of the 
panel had indicated religious feelings would have no effect on 
their decision. (Hornsby at 23; app. A.) 
The trial court refused Hornsby's request to question the 
potential jurors as to their religious affiliation, their 
residence in the religious unit (stake) in which the LDS welfare 
farm was located or whether any of them held office in the LDS 
Church. (R. 325-328; Hornsby at 23-24; app. A.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE 
It is Respondent's position that although this case presents 
an issue of great importance, the issue was properly dealt with 
and resolved by the Utah Court of Appeals. That is, the Court of 
Appeals recognized that the trial court had abused its discretion 
and committed reversible error by refusing to voir dire 
prospective jurors as to their religious affiliation for the 
limited purpose of gathering enough information in order to 
intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges. The Court of 
Appeals realized that the peremptory challenge performs a valuable 
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function in the jury system and that its efficacy is vitiated when 
a party is not permitted to gather enough information from 
prospective jurors in order to intelligently exercise that right. 
The Court of Appeals further recognized that the law in this 
area is well settled and it therefore remanded the case back to 
District Court for a new trial. Because the law is so well 
established in this area, this is not a case which should be 
entertained by this Court. 
POINT II 
DURING THE VOIR DIRE PROCESS OF A TRIAL IN 
WHICH A RELIGIOUS ENTITY IS A PARTY THERETO, A 
LITIGANT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO INQUIRE AS TO 
THE RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF A PROSPECTIVE 
JUROR FOR THE PURPOSE OF INTELLIGENTLY 
EXERCISING A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE. 
It is a widely accepted principle of law that whenever a 
religious organization is a party to the litigation, the religious 
faith of a prospective juror is a proper subject of inquiry. 47 
Am. Jur. 2d, Jury, Section 283. There is a plethora of case law 
which supports this basic proposition. 
The landmark case of Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of 
Baltimore * 143 A.2d 627 (Md. 1958) addressed the issue concerning 
the voir dire inquiry of a prospective juror's religious 
affiliation. In Casey * the Maryland Court of Appeals set forth as 
follows: 
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[T]he law is clear that, if the religious 
affiliation of a juror might reasonably 
prevent him from arriving at a fair and 
impartial verdict in a particular case because 
of the nature of the case, the parties are 
entitled to ferret out, or preferably have the 
court discover for them, the existence of bias 
or prejudice resulting from such affiliation. 
In other words, a party is entitled to a jury 
free of all disqualifying bias or prejudice 
without exception, and not merely a jury free 
of bias or prejudice of a general or abstract 
nature....Miles v. United States, 1881, 103 
U.S. 304, 26 L.Ed. 481 [jurors asked if they 
believed in the truth of Mormon 
teachings]...We hold that the examination of 
the prospective jurors on their voir dire in 
this case was not sufficiently comprehensive 
to assure the selection of a fair and 
impartial jury. 
Casey, 143 A.2d at 632 
It is plaintiff-respondent's position that in accordance with 
Casey# Plaintiff's counsel in the case at bar should have been 
permitted to voir dire prospective jurors concerning their 
affiliation with the defendant LDS Church. That is, pursuant to 
Casey, the parties are entitled to ferret out or discover the 
existence of any and all disqualifying bias or prejudice a juror 
may have as a result of being affiliated with a religious entity 
which is a party to the lawsuit. It is this respondent's belief 
that the ferreting out of bias or prejudice applies to latent bias 
as well as acknowledged bias. Accordingly, it is very reasonable 
to assume that although a prospective juror may make a blanket 
statement that he is capable of being an impartial juror, that 
juror may harbor a latent and unacknowledged prejudice or bias 
because of his religious affiliations. As the Supreme Court of 
Utah stated in State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1984): 
The most characteristic feature of prejudice 
is its inability to recognize itself. It is 
unrealistic to expect that any but the most 
sensitive and thoughtful jurors (frequently 
those least likely to be biased) will have 
the personal insight, candor and openness to 
raise their hands in court and declare 
themselves biased. 
Thus, although none of the prospective jurors answered 
affirmatively when asked if they would find it difficult to be 
fair and impartial and render a judgment against the LDS Church, 
had the trial court permitted inquiry into the religious 
affiliation of prospective jurors, plaintiff's counsel would have 
had an opportunity to exercise his peremptory challenges in a more 
considered manner. 
In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed. 759 
(1965), the United States Supreme Court discussed the function of 
the peremptory challenge: 
The persistence of peremptories and their 
extensive use demonstrate the long and widely 
held belief that peremptory challenge is a 
necessary part of trial by jury. See Lewis v. 
United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376. Although 
"[t]here is nothing in the Constitution of the 
United States which requires the Congress [or 
the States] to grant peremptory challenges," 
Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586, 
nonetheless the challenge is "one of the most 
important of the rights secured to the 
accused," Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 
396, 408. The denial or impairment of the 
right is reversible error without a showing of 
prejudice, Lewis v. United States, supra: 
Harrison v. United States, 163 U.S. 140; cf. 
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co, v. Shane, 157 
U.S. 348. "For it is, as Blackstone says, an 
arbitrary and capricious right; and it must be 
exercised with full freedom, or it fails of 
its full purpose." Lewis v. United States, 
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supra, at 378. 
The function of the challenge is not only to 
eliminate extremes of partiality on both 
sides, but to assure the parties that the 
jurors before whom they try the case will 
decide on the basis of the evidence placed 
before them, and not otherwise. 
* * * 
The essential nature of the peremptory 
challenge is that it is one exercised without 
a reason stated, without inquiry and without 
being subject to the court's control, 
[citations omitted] While challenges for 
cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly 
specified, provable and legally cognizable 
basis of partiality, the peremptory permits 
rejection for a real or imagined partiality 
that is less easily designated or 
demonstrable. [citations omitted] It is 
often exercised upon the "sudden impressions 
and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to 
conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of 
another/' [citations omitted], upon a juror's 
"habits and associations" [citations 
omitted]...It is no .less frequently exercised 
on grounds normally thought irrelevant to 
legal proceedings or official action, namely, 
the race, religion, nationality, occupation or 
affiliations of people summoned for jury duty, 
[emphasis added] 
Swain, 380 U.S. at 219-220. 
Accordingly, inasmuch as a person's religion is not readily 
discernable from appearance, a peremptory challenge exercised on 
religious grounds necessarily presupposes an inquiry into the 
same. 
In State v. Barnett, 445 P.2d 124 (Or. 1968), counsel was 
permitted to ask a prospective juror whether he had any religious 
belief or affiliation that would prevent him from being a fair 
juror. However, counsel was not permitted to follow-up the 
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juror's answer by asking what his religious faith was* In 
reversing the trial court, the Oregon Supreme Court stated as 
follows: 
It is true that the prospective jurors stated 
that they did not have any religious beliefs 
that would prevent them from being impartial 
jurors and from giving the defendant a fair 
trial. A party does not need to be limited by 
that answer, however; he can pursue the 
matter and find out the particular religious 
belief of the venireman. A party can make his 
own determination whether a venireman with a 
particular belief will be impartial or 
unprejudiced and exercise his peremptory 
challenge accordingly. 
Barnett, 445 P.2d at 125. 
Further, in State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984) this 
Court discussed the utilization of peremptory challenges. This 
Court stated as follows: 
Properly utilized, however, it may be seen 
that the peremptory challenge performs a 
valuable function in our jury system. It's 
efficacy is necessarily vitiated when a party 
is not permitted to gather enough information 
from prospective jurors in order to exercise 
his right intelligently. In State v. Taylor, 
Utah 664 P.2d 439, 447 (1983), we emphasized 
that "voir dire examination has as its proper 
purposes both the detection of actual bias and 
the collection of data to permit informed 
exercise of peremptory challenge. (citations 
omitted) 
Ball, 685 P.2d at 1059. 
Thus, in accordance with the Ball decision, in order for a 
peremptory challenge to perform its proper function, a party must 
be permitted to gather enough information from prospective jurors 
to enable him to intelligently exercise that right. In the 
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instant case plaintiff's inquiry was curtailed to a point where he 
was unable to gather enough information to allow him to 
intelligently exercise his right to peremptory challenges. This 
was reversible error and the Court of Appeals recognized it as 
such. 
Another.case supportive of plaintiff-respondent's position is 
United States v. Affleck, 776 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1985) wherein 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the trial court 
provided a fair trial when it allowed a forty-four page 
questionnaire to be submitted to prospective jurors asking for 
detailed information about, inter alia, religious affiliation. 
Affleck involved the prosecution of a defendant who had defrauded 
persons affiliated with the Mormon Church. Returning a guilty 
verdict in Affleck would vindidate the rights of Mormons, and, 
therefore, counsel needed to ferret out religious bias and 
prejudice - acknowledged or latent - against the accused. In the 
instant case, a verdict finding liability on the part of the 
defendants would be a finding against the Mormon Church and 
therefore plaintifffs counsel should have been permitted to ferret 
out religious bias against the plaintiff. That is, a juror who 
was a member of the LDS Church may very well have perceived the 
lawsuit as being a cause brought against "my church." Counsel for 
plaintiff should have been afforded an opportunity to find out any 
such latent bias. 
See also Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d 951 (D.C. App. 
1977) wherein the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated: 
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Inquiry as to a juror's religious beliefs is 
proper on voir dire where religious issues are 
presented expressly in the case, or where a 
religious organization is a party to the 
litigation/ or where it is a necessary 
predicate to the exercise of peremptory 
challenges. 
Coleman, 379 A.2d at 954. 
For other cases consistent with the aforementioned case law, 
see the following: McGowan v. United States, 485 A.2d 1191 (D.C. 
App. 1983); State v. Miller, 88 P.2d 526 (Id. 1939); Young v. 
State, 271 P.426 (Ok. 1928). 
Based upon the case law cited herein. Respondent maintains 
that the Utah Court of Appeals was correct in its determination 
that the trial court committed reversible error by impairing 
plaintifffs right to intelligently exercise his peremptory 
challenges. More specifically, in the case at bar the Utah Court 
of Appeals set forth as follows: 
Substantial impairment of the right to 
informed exercise of peremptory challenges is 
reversible error. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219; 
Ball, 685 P.2d at 1060. In the instant case, 
the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying voir dire regarding the prospective 
jurors1 affiliation with the LDS Church. The 
scope of voir dire should be sufficiently 
broad to allow the parties intelligently to 
exercise their peremptory challenges. 
87 UTAH ADV. Rep. 23 (1988) [see decision at appendix A] 
POINT III 
PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT CONTAINED IN POINT III 
OF ITS BRIEF WAS NOT TIMELY RAISED, AND 
THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE ENTERTAINED BY THIS 
COURT. 
At page 13 of Petitioner's brief, it is argued that 
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"Constitutional and statutory provisions governing jury selection 
make religious questioning for peremptory challenge purposes 
improper." Petitioner then refers this Court to Article I Section 
4 of the Constitution of Utah, Article VI Section 3 of the United 
States Constitution, and Section 78-46-3, Utah Code Annotated. 
Inasmuch as Petitioner failed to raise the aforementioned 
provisions in arguing before the Court of Appeals in this matter, 
he is precluded from raising arguments based on those provisions 
at this time. 
POINT IV 
DURING THE VOIR DIRE PROCESS OF A TRIAL IN 
WHICH A RELIGIOUS ENTITY IS A PARTY THERETO, A 
LITIGANT MAY INQUIRE AS TO THE RELIGIOUS 
AFFILIATION OF A PROSPECTIVE JUROR WITHOUT 
VIOLATING ANY CONSTITUTIONAL AND/OR STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS CONCERNING JURY SELECTION. 
As set forth hereinabove, Respondent herein maintains that 
the Consitutional arguments raised in Point III of Petitioner's 
brief are not timely and therefore should not be entertained. 
However, even if timely raised, the arguments of Petitioner are 
misplaced and may not be relied upon in the instant case. 
Petitioner cites a number of constitutional and statutory 
provisions as standing for the proposition that the religious 
affiliation of prospective jurors may not be inquired into during 
the voir dire process. Specifically, Petitioner states as 
follows: 
These clear and unequivocal statements prevent 
both a religious test for service as a juror 
and any form of discrimination by any 
governmental agency against persons on account 
of religious preference or the absence of 
religious preference. 
* * * 
The ruling of the Court of Appeals...requires 
courts to use their power in cases in which a 
religion is involved to compel jurors to 
disclose religious views so that peremptory 
challenges can be used systematically to 
discriminate against jurors of a particular 
religious persuasion. 
In State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984) this Court 
discussed Article I, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution, one of 
the same provisions which Petitioner asserts precludes inquiry 
into a prospective juror's religious affiliation. In Ball, the 
Court set forth the following: 
Article 1/ Section 4 of the Utah Constitution 
states in pertinent part: "The rights of 
conscience shall never be infringed...nor 
shall any person be incompetent as a...juror 
on account of religious belief or the absence 
thereof." We must decide whether this 
provision of the Utah Constitution prohibits 
asking a prospective juror whether his 
abstention from alcohol is based on "personal 
or religious" grounds. 
[1] The question of whether the juror's 
abstention was "for a personal conviction or a 
religious one" has only a minimal relationship 
to the constitutional language regarding 
incompetence of jurors because of "religious 
belief or the absence thereof." The mere 
asking of the question has nothing to do with 
competence to serve, that is, with the juror's 
basic qualifications to participate in a 
panel. 
* * * 
Religious beliefs, unlike gender or race, are 
not readily apparent, and their existence, if 
directly related to the subject matter of the 
suit (as they may be in a case involving 
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alcohol consumption), must be determined by 
preliminary inquiry. Should those religious 
beliefs (or the absence thereof) be the basis 
for actual bias, prejudice, or impartiality, a 
challenge for cause would likewise lie. In 
that event, an individual would not be 
declared "incompetent...on account of 
religious belief11 in violation of the 
constitution, but rather unfit to serve in a 
particular cause because of actual prejudice. 
The fact that actual bias or prejudice is 
related in some way to an individual's 
religious beliefs does not preclude exclusion 
for demonstrated inability to serve as an 
impartial juror. To declare otherwise would 
be to subordinate the rights of a criminal 
defendant to receive a fair trial before an 
impartial jury to the persons prejudiced by 
their religion (or irreligion) against certain 
defendants or behavior. Such a conflict 
between constitutional values is not required 
by the language of Art. I, Section 4. 
Thus the question of onefs competence for jury 
service generally is a separate question from 
the issue of one's potential lack of 
impartiality in a particular case. [emphasis 
added] 
[4] Properly utilized, however, it may be seen 
that the peremptory challenge performs a 
valuable function in our jury system. Its 
efficacy is necessarily vitiated when a party 
is not permitted to gather enough information 
from prospective jurors in order to exercise 
his right intelligently. In State v. Taylor, 
Utah 664 P.2d 439, 447 (1983), we emphasized 
that "voir dire examination has as its proper 
purposes both the detection of actual bias and 
the collection of data to permit informed 
exercise of the peremptory challenge11 
(citations omitted). We view the question 
asked here by defense counsel as being 
reasonably calculated to discover any latent 
bias that may have existed among the four 
veniremen who stated that they did not drink; 
the information sought, even if it would not 
have supported a challenge for cause, would 
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have allowed defense counsel to exercise his 
peremptory challenges more intelligently. 
Similarly, in the instant case if counsel were permitted to 
inquire as to a jurorfs religious affiliation, and then utilize a 
peremptory challenge to dismiss that juror, the juror dismissed 
would not be deemed incompetent on account of religious belief in 
violation of the constitution; rather, it would merely be a 
determination that the juror harbored a latent prejudice or bias 
in this particular cause. That is, as set forth in Ballt the 
question of one's competence to be a juror is a different and 
separate question from the issue of onefs potential lack of 
impartiality. The mere asking of the question concerning 
religious affiliation has nothing to do with competence to serve 
and with a juror's basic qualification to participate in a panel. 
Accordingly, inasmuch as a litigant is entitled to collect 
data to permit an informed exercise of the peremptory challenge, 
and to ferret out any existing latent bias, merely inquiring into 
one's religious affiliation does not transgress any constitutional 
or statutory provision. 
See also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct 824, 13 L.Ed 
759 (1965) wherein the United States Supreme Court set forth the 
following: 
[Peremptory challenges are often] exercised on 
grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal 
proceedings or official action, namely, 
the...religion...or affiliations of people 
summoned for jury duty. 
* • * 
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In the quest for an impartial and qualified 
jury, Negro and white, Protestant and 
Catholic, are alike subject to being 
challenged without cause. 
Swain, 380 U*S. at 220 and 221 
Implicit within this language is the Supreme Courtfs belief 
that inquiry into a prospective juror's religious affiliation does 
not transgress Constitutional standards. That is, the Court 
realizes that peremptory challenges may be exercised based upon a 
person's religious affiliation. It follows that exercising a 
peremptory challenge based upon one's religious affiliation 
necessarily entails an inquiry into the same* Moreover, if such 
an inquiry would be in violation of constitutional provisions, the 
Supreme Court certainly would have used different language than 
that cited hereinabove. 
POINT V 
DURING THE VOIR DIRE PROCESS OF A TRIAL IN 
WHICH A RELIGIOUS ENTITY IS A PARTY THERETO, 
AN INQUIRY AS TO A PROSPECTIVE JUROR'S 
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION DOES NOT INVADE THE 
JUROR'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY. 
Without citing any authority in support of its position, 
Petitioner, at Point IV of its brief intimates that an inquiry 
into a prospective juror's religious affiliation would invade the 
juror's right to privacy of religious beliefs. 
It is this respondent's belief that merely inquiring into 
one's religious affiliation is not tantamount to an invasion of 
that person's privacy. 
In State v. Ball, in determining that juror privacy was not 
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an issue in the case, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
The mere revelation of the general fact that a 
religious belief is the basis of a practice, 
without a further probing of the nature or 
extent of any particular religious belief, 
does not result in any injury to the juror. 
Any harmless disturbance of a jurorfs privacy 
that may occur through the revelation of such 
general information is outweighed by its close 
relevance to the possibility of bias in the 
context of a trial for driving under the 
influence of alcohol. 
We hold that asking a venireman whether his 
abstention from the drinking of alcohol has a 
religious basis is not prohibited by the Utah 
constitution. 
Ball, 685 P.2d at 1060. 
Similarly, an issue of juror privacy does not exist on the 
facts of this case. Plaintiff-respondent did not wish to probe 
into the extent of any juror's particular religious belief. 
Rather, respondent merely desired to inquire as to the general 
religious affiliation of prospective jurors, including to which 
local units of the LDS Church the member may belong, whether the 
individual holds any leadership position or is employed by the 
Church etc. without probing into specific religious beliefs. 
Further, inasmuch as the LDS Church is a party to this lawsuit, 
any harmless disturbance of a juror's privacy that may occur 
through the revelation of such general information is clearly 
outweighed by its close relevance to the possibility of bias. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the basic objectives of our judicial system is to 
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ensure litigants of a fair trial, free of any bias or prejudice. 
To help ensure a fair trial, voir dire examination has become an 
important part of a jury trial. Voir dire examination has as its 
proper purposes, both the detection of actual bias as well as the 
collection of data to permit informed exercise of peremptory 
challenges. The function of the challenge is to assure the 
parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide 
on the basis of the evidence presented at trial, and not 
otherwise. Accordingly, if a peremptory challenge is to perform 
its proper function, a party must be permitted to gather enough 
information from prospective jurors to enable him to exercise his 
challenges intelligently. 
The courts have consistently held that a litigant may ferret 
out information so as to detect any latent bias that may have a 
prejudicial effect on the outcome of a case. In the case at bar, 
the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that the trial court 
committed reversible error by improperly limiting voir dire. That 
is, in a situation such as this wherein the LDS Church is a party-
defendant, the religious affiliation of a juror might prevent him 
from arriving at a fair and impartial verdict. Specifically, a 
juror who is a member of the LDS Church may very well perceive the 
lawsuit as a cause of action against "my church". Because of the 
possible existence of a juror's latent bias resulting from being 
affiliated with a party-defendant, Respondent was entitled to 
discover any such bias resulting from religious affiliation. 
Thus, he should have been permitted to inquire in some detail as 
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to the religious affiliation of prospective jurors. 
Further, pursuant to the overwhelming authority cited 
hereinabove, a litigant in a case such as this may inquire as to 
the religious affiliation of a prospective juror without violating 
any constitutional provisions and without invading a juror's right 
to privacy* 
Inasmuch as the law is well settled in this area, and the 
Court of Appeals has rectified the error committed by the trial 
court, this Court should deny Petitioner's Petition for 
Certiorari. 
DATED this J ^ day of October, 1988. 
BLACK & MOORE 
H-
tines R. 
Jajnes R. Black 
jfrin' M. Kev  McDonough 
X. 
Layira/ Boyer 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant-
Respondent James Hornsby 
1 Q 
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through X; inclusive, 
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No. 880031-CA 
FILED: July 26,1988 
f HIRD DISTRICT 
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Mary A. Rudolph, Laura L. Boyer, James R. 
Black. 
Stephen G. Morgan for Respondent Sutton. 
Allen M. Swan for Respondent LDS Church. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of no 
cause of action entered on a special jury 
verdict. Because the trial court improperly 
limited voir dire of the jury panel, we vacate 
the judgment and remand the case for a new 
trial. 
On March 30, 1983, defendants Charles 
Giblett, a farmer for defendant Corporation 
of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (L.D.S. 
Church), and John Sutton were attempting to 
load into a horse trailer two cows owned by 
the L.D.S. Church. Approximately one month 
earlier, the two cows had crossed the fences 
separating Sutton's property and the L.D.S. 
Church's welfare farm located immediately 
northwest of Sutton's property. Sutton and 
Giblett had agreed to delay retrieving the cows 
to avoid disturbing Sutton's cattle. 
On March 30, Sutton opened his corral gate 
and backed his trailer into the opening. He 
and Giblett then attached the gate to the 
trailer with baling wire and a hook. As the 
two men attempted to herd the cows into the 
trailer, one cow entered the trailer, but the 
other cow threw its weight against the gate, 
dislodging it from the trailer. The cow exited 
the corral and entered a large field owned by 
Kennecott Corporation. For the next hour, 
Sutton and Giblett, assisted by Sutton's dau-
ghter Mary and two boys, attempted to direct 
r. Rep. 23 f £ 
the errant cow back onto Sutton's property. 
Sutton and Mary drove in separate vehicles 
with emergency lights flashing, trying to locate 
the cow. Mary parked and exited her car in a 
further attempt to locate the cow. When she 
spotted the cow, she returned to her car. 
At that moment, plaintiff James Hornsby, 
an employee of Kennecott, was driving home 
on his motorcycle. He noticed Mary waving 
her arms at him, but considered her waving to 
be a greeting, not a warning. Approximately 
200 feet past Mary and her car, the cow 
darted out onto the road. Unable to avoid the 
cow, Hornsby laid his motorcycle down on the 
road and suffered serious injuries. 
Hornsby filed this action for damages, all-
eging negligence on the part of defendants. In 
response to special interrogatories, the jury 
found no negligence on the part of any of the 
defendants but determined plaintiff was negl-
igent and his negligence was the proximate 
cause of his injuries. The trial court entered 
judgment on the verdict in favor of defend-
ants. 
On appeal, Hornsby alleges the trial court 
erred in refusing to voir dire members of the 
jury panel concerning their affiliation with the 
L.D.S. Church. At the time of voir dire, 
Hornsby proposed the following questions, 
among others, to the trial court: 
Are any of you members of the 
L.D.S. Church? 
Would that, in any way, affect your 
ability to evaluate the evidence in 
this case and render a fair decision 
for the plaintiff? 
Did any of you hold a position in 
the L.D.S. Church such as Bishop 
or presiding officer or counselor? 
Which stake was that in? Where is 
that located?1 
Would that position affect you in 
making a fair decision in this case? 
If the evidence were favorable to 
the plaintiff in this case, would you 
have a problem in awarding a jud-
gment against the L.D.S. Church? 
The trial court rejected Hornsby's proposed 
questions, later explaining "it's none of this 
Court's business, or anybody's business what 
[jurors'] religious preferences are." The court 
then asked: 
Are there any of you who feel that 
you would have trouble being an 
impartial juror because of feelings 
you may have either pro or con 
with regard to the L.D.S. Church 
that you think might affect your 
ability to be a fair and impartial 
juror in this case? If so, I'd like 
you to raise your hand. 
The court stated for the record that all 
members of the panel had indicated religious 
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sion. 
Hornsby argues the trial court erred /in 
limiting voir dire regarding the jury panel's 
religious affiliations. The L.D.S Church* con-
tends where religious doctrine or practices are 
not at£ issue, it is norproper for a"court to 
inquire as to a juror's "religious affiliation. 
The scope of voir dire is a matter within the 
sound discretion of the trial court, and its 
rulings with respect thereto will not be distu-
rbed on appeal absent a demonstrated abuse 
of discretion. Maltby vc Cox Constir. Co., 
Inc., 598 P.2d 336 (Utah 1979), cert, denied, 
444 U.S. 945 (1979). The trial court abuses its 
discretion when, "considering the totality of 
the questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an 
adequate opportunity to gain the information 
necessary to evaluate jurors." State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439,448 (Utah 1988). 
Voir dire has as one of its purposes the 
detection of bias sufficient to challenge a 
prospective juror for cause. State v. Taylor, 
664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), Under Utah R. Civ. 
P. 47(f), a prospective juror may be challe-
nged for cause on any of the folllowing 
grounds: 
(1) A want of any of the qualifica-
tions prescribed by law to render a 
person competent as a juror. 
(2) Consanguinity or affinity within 
the fourth degree to either party, or 
to an officer of a corporation that 
is a party. 
(3) Standing in the relation of 
debtor and creditor, guardian and 
ward, master and servant, employer 
and employee, or principal and 
agent, to either party, or united in 
business with either party, or being 
on any bond or obligation for either 
party; provided, that the relation-
ship of debtor and creditor shall be 
deemed not to exist between a 
municipality and a resident thereof 
indebted to such municipality by 
reason of a tax, license fee, or 
service charge for water power, 
light or other services rendered to 
such resident. 
(4) Having served as a juror, or 
having been a witness, on a prev-
ious trial between the same parties 
for the same cause of action, or 
being then a witness therein. 
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of 
the juror in the result of the action, 
or in the main question involved in 
the actioQ, except his interest as a 
member or citizen of a municipal 
corporation. 
(6) That a state of mind exists on 
the part of the juror with reference 
to the cause, or to either party, 
which will prevent him from acting 
impartially and without prejudice to 
the substantial right? of the party 
challenging; but no person shall be 
disqualified as a juror by reason of 
having formed or expressed an 
opinion upon the matter or cause to, 
be submitted to such jury, founded 
upon public rumor, statements in 
public journals or common notor-
iety/ if it satisfactorily appears to 
the court that the juror can and 
will, notwithstanding such opinion, 
act impartially and fairly upon the 
matter to be submitted to hinu 
We believe the question asked by the trial 
court was' sufficient to detect any actual sub-
jective bias to warrant a challenge for cause 
under subsection (6). Because it is not neces-
sary to this appeal, we do not decide whether 
the voir dire was sufficient to reveal circums-
tances or relationships that would warrant 
challenges for cause under other subsections of 
Rule 47(f). 
A second proper purpose for voir dire is 
"the collection of data to permit informed 
exercise of the peremptory challenge." Taylor, 
664 P.2d at 447, Regarding peremptory chal-
lenges, the United States Supreme Court has 
held: 
The essential nature of the perem-
ptory challenge is that it is one 
exercised without a reason slated, 
without inquiry and without being 
subject to the court's control. 
While challenges for cause permit 
rejection of jurors on a nanowly 
specified, provable and legally 
cognizable basis of partiality, the 
peremptory permits rejection for a 
real or imagined partiality that is 
less easily designated or demonstr-
able. 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S 202, 220 (1965) 
(citations omitted). A prospective juror's 
group affiliations is a common and proper 
topic for voir dire and ground for a peremp-
tory challenge. As the Swain Court continued: 
[A peremptory challenge] is often 
exercised ... upon a juror's "habits 
and associations" .... It is no less 
frequently exercised on grounds 
normally thought irrelevant to legal 
proceedings or official action, 
namely, the race, religion, nation-
ality, occupation or affiliations of 
people summoned for jury duty. 
Ido (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 6%, 
70 (1887)) (emphasis added). 
The issue of religion as a topic for voir dire 
was addressed in State v Ball, 685 P 2d 1055 
(Utah 1984). In Ball, defendaint was charged 
with driving under the influence of alcohol. 
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l>iifing^voir dire, the trial courf asked the* jury 
panel^  wKethe^ any of^them^had prejudices 
against"peopler that drink!! None indicated they 
did. Defendant' then asked "if any of them 
chose not to drink for any reason. Four "jurors 
proposed to^ the .trial court to* ask if those 
jurors'choice not to drink was for a personal 
or a religious conviction. The trial court, 
concerned with constitutional protections, 
denied defendant's request. Defendant was 
able to eliminate three of the four non* 
drinking jurors by exercising'all of his pere-
mptory challenges, but the fourth sat on the 
jury which convicted him. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held 
defendant's question as to the four jurors' 
reasons for their non-use of alcohol should 
have been allowed. The Court acknowledged 
the "extreme deference afforded in Swain to 
the unfettered exercise of [peremptory] chall-
enges/ and stated as follows: 
Religious beliefs,0 unlike gender or 
race, are not readily apparent, and 
their existence, if directly related to 
ther subject matter of, the suit ... 
must be determined by preliminary 
inquiry .... Voir dire is intended to 
\&<?n&& * \s*& tot <m&£& *sA ^ ta& 
court to carefully and skillfully 
determine, by inquiry, whether 
biases and prejudices, latent as well 
as acknowledged, will interfere with 
a fair trial if a particular juror 
serves in it. 
Id. at 1057,1058: 
Both Swain and Ball recognize there ar* 
cases where religion and group" affiliation ar* 
appropriate topics for voir dire. In the instant 
case, defendant did not propose to question 
the prospective jurors as to their specific 
beliefs.2 Rather, as the L.D.S. Church was on* 
of the parties, defendant merely proposed to 
question the jurors regarding their affiliation 
with the L.D.S. Church. ^Whenever a religiou* 
organization is" a party to the litigation, votf 
dire regarding the jury panel's religious affil" 
iations is proper. State%v. Via, 146 Ariz. 108f 
704 P.2d 238 (1985); Coleman v. United 
States, 379 A.2d 951 (D.C. 1977); Casey + 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 2l1 
Substantial impairment of the right to inf' 
ormed exercise of peremptory challenges & 
reversible error. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219; Batfr 
685 P.2d at 1060. In the instant case, the tri*1 
court abused its discretion in denying voir dir* 
regarding the prospective jurors' affiliation 
with the L.D.S. Church. The scope of voi* 
dire should be sufficiently broad to allow thc 
parties intelligently to exercise their peremp" 
tory challenges. In so holding, we do not 
require the trial court to propound the precis^ 
questions proposed by Hornsby. Rather, W^  
leave., intact ^he "considerable discretion'affo-
rded to trial ^ courts fountain voirtdire within* 
reasonable limits." See Ball, 685 P.2d at 1060 
(trial "court has a duty to * protect juror 
privacy); People v. Williams, 29 Cal.3d 392, 
court should not permit inordinately extensive 
and unfocused questioning). The judgment in 
favor of defendants is vacated and the case is 
remanded for a new trial.3 
In light of our decision to remand for a new 
trial, it is not necessary to discuss Hornsby's 
other alleged errors. However, since the trial 
court may be faced with the same issues W 
remand, we make the following observations. 
See State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 
1986). 
Hornsby argues defendants' use of the term 
"welfare"' when referring to the farm owned 
by the L.D.S. Church improperly biased the 
jury in their favor and was in violation of a 
court order. We fail to find any met t in 
Hornsby's contention. The subject property is 
commonly referred to as a welfare farm. 
Hornsby offers no evidence of improper Mac 
other than mere speculation. Furthermore, 
Hornsby fails to cite to any record evidence of 
a court order regarding the use of the term 
v "welfare/ 
Hornsby also argues the trial court erred in 
refusing to instruct the jury on res ipsa loqu-
itur, negligence per se, and stnet liability. "A 
party is entitled to have the jury instructed on 
his theories of the case and points of law 
provided competent evidence is presented to 
support them." Steele v. Bremholt, 747 P.2<J 
433, 435 (Utah App. 1987). We will reverse a 
trial court's judgment for failure to give a 
requested instruction only if the jury is prej-
udicially misled or insufficiently or erroneo-
usly advised on the law. Id. 
To warrant a res ipsa loquitur instruction, a 
plaintiff must show: 1) the accident was one 
which ordinarily does not happen but for 
someone's negligence; 2) plaintiffs own use 
or operation of the agency or instrumentality 
was not primarily responsible for the injury; 
and 3) the agency or instrumentality causing 
the injury was within defendant's exclusive 
control and management. Roylance v. Rowe, 
737 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah App. 1987). Hornsby 
claims the evidence in the instant case establ-
ishes the three required elements lor a res ipsa 
loquitur instruction. However, application of 
res ipsa loquitur presupposes a plaintiffs 
inability to point to the specific allegedly 
negligent act which caused the injury. Kusy v. 
K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 
1232 (Utah 1984). If the "evidence in the case 
reveals all of the facts and circumstances of 
the occurrence and clearly establishes the 
precise allegedly negligent act which is the 
cause of plaintiffs injury," then res ipsa 
loquitur is not applicable. Roylance, 737 P.2d 
at 235. 
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In the instant case, the/evidence presented at 
trial described and established the'act comm-
itted by^Giblett arid Sutton vwliich7Hofnsby 
alleges to be negligent
 v Defendants backed the 
horse trailer into the corral gate opening.! They 
then attached the rear doors of the trailer to 
the gate with baling wire. As they attempted 
to load the cows into the trailer, one of the 
cows threw its weight'against "the gatet dislo-
dging it from the trailer. The coW escaped 
through the opening. As the allegedly negli-
gent act was clear from the evidence, res ipsa 
loquitur was not applicable. 
The trial court also refused Hornsby's 
requested* instruction on negligence per "se. 
Violation of a statute or ordinance is neglig-
ence per se. Jorgensen v. Issa, 735LP.2d 80 
(Utah App. 1987). Hornsby argues defendants 
violated Salt Lake County Ordinances,§10-
10-3 (1966),(now §14:20.050 (1986)), which 
states: 
Every person staking, tethering, 
herding, grazing or pasturing,' or 
allowing to run at large or causing 
to be stakeds tethered, herded, 
grazed or pastured, or allowed to 
run at large, any horse, cow, mule, 
sheep, goat or swine8 or other 
animal upon any of the public hig-
hways of the county shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanor. 
Defendants' conduct was not in violation of 
section 10-10-3. They were not staking, 
tethering, herding;* grazing,' or pasturing the 
errant cow under the common definitions of 
those termso Nor did defendants "allow" the 
cow to run at large. See Santanello v. Cooper, 
106 "Ariz. 262, 475 P.2d 246 (1970) ("allow* 
means to sanction/ permit, acknowledge, 
approve of). 
In any event, section 10-10-3 must be 
construed in light of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-
38(3) (1987), which States: 
In any civil action brought by tne 
owner, operator, or occupant of a 
motor vehicle ... for damages 
caused by collision with any dom-
estic animal or animals on a 
highway, there is no presumption 
that the collision was due to negli-
gence on behalf of the owner or the 
person in possession of livestock. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-16 (1987) provides: 
The provisions of this chapter are 
applicable and uniform throughout 
this state and in all of its political 
subdivisions and municipalities. A 
local authority may not enact or 
enforce any rule or ordinance in 
conflict with the provisions of this 
chapter. Local authorities may, 
however, adopt ordinances consis-
CODE«CO, 
Provo, Utah 
tent with, this ^chapter, and additi-
onal traffic ordinances which are 
not in conflict with this chapter. 
The trial 'court's refusal, of Horasby's reque-
sted negligence'per se instruction was correct. , 
Finally, Hornsby contends the court erred in 
refusing to instruct the jury on stria liability. 
Hornsby claims the cow had a dangerous or 
vicious tendency known to\ defendants. 
Nothing in the record supports his assertion. 
The court's refusal to give the instruction was 
therefore justified. 
Russell W Bench, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
1 CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Norman H. Jackson/Judge 
1. A stake is a geographical unit in the L.D.S. 
Church. In his appellate briefr Hornsby also claims 
he should have been allowed to ask whether any 
juror attended the Oquirrh Stake from where the 
cow came, whether any of them held positions in 
that stake, and whether any of them eveir volunte-
ered at the subject farm or knew anyone who had or 
did. 
2. The religious beliefs of the prospective jurors are 
not directly related to the subject matter ol this suit, 
and hence could not properly be examined during 
voir dire. 
3. Defendants John and Mary Sutton argue any 
potential prejudice in favor of the L.D.S. Church 
caused by the trial court's error did not .iffeet the 
jury's finding ' as /to their lack of negligence. 
However, in view of the overlapping nature of the 
possible liabilities, justice requires a new trial as to 
all defendants. See Kord's Ambulance Sen., Inc. v. 
White, 14 Ariz. App, 294;482P.2d903 (1971). 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES N. HORNSBY, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a 
Utah corporation sole, CHARLES 
GIBLETT, JOHN SUTTON AND MARY 
LEE SUTTON, and DOES I through 
X, Inclusive, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT 
civil N O . -e-e-fs^ ro-rs-
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, District Judge, commencing 
Tuesday the 29th day of October, 1985 and continuing through 
Friday the 1st day of November, 1985, Laura L* Boyer appearing 
for plaintiff, Allen M. Swan of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
appearing for defendants Corporation of the Presiding Bishop 
of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and Charles 
Giblett and Stephen G. Morgan of Morgan, Scalley & Reading 
appearing for defendants John Sutton and Mary Lee Sutton 
heard and the matter having been submitted to the jury on 
a Special Verdict and the jury having returned its Special 
Verdict finding that the plaintiff, James Hornsby, was negligent 
and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident 
and finding that none of the defendants were negligent, now 
therefore it is hereby 
ORDERED that judgment enter on the verdict in favor 
of each of the defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause 
of action together with defendants1 costs incurred herein 
in the sum of 9 *> " »**<*"*«>-... . . 
DATED this /</ day of November 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HWOLEY 
Ciert 
By 
Served by mailing copies this 
OeputvClerk / D i s t r i c t Judg 
day of November, 
1985, to Laura L. Boyer, 3167 West 4700 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84118 and to Stephen G. Morgan, 261 East 300 South, 
2nd Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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Allenv M. Swan 
